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foregrounding the damage done by encoding a permission-first approach into governance
structures and digital platforms. These stories unsettle the common copyright narrative—
the one that tells us that copyright encourages learning and the creation and dissemination
of works—laying bare its disconnect from the current realities of our digital dependency.
Turning to consider the justifications for copyright control, we underscore the critical role of
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“It were therefore the height of folly to quit this spot at present… [I]f you take my
advice, you will fnd pastime…in telling of stories, in which the invention of one
may aford solace to all the company of his hearers…. So please you, then, I ordain,
that…we be free to discourse of such matters as most commend themselves, to each
in turn.”1
HISTORY DOES NOT REPEAT ITSELF; but it echoes. As the Black Death swept

across Europe in the fourteenth century, Giovanni Boccaccio wrote his seminal
masterwork, Te Decameron. In it, ten nobles fee pestilential Florence for a
country manor, where they regale one another with tales for ten nights. In crafting
the hundred tales contained in Te Decameron, Boccaccio drew from local oral
traditions and prior writings—the stories are drawn from across languages,
cultures, and centuries, from second century Greek tales to plots derived from
Middle Eastern and Indian precursors. It may have been one of the world’s
earliest printed books, but six and a half centuries later, as the novel coronavirus
pandemic sweeps across the globe, Te Decameron’s recursive storytelling feels
familiar. When lockdowns were imposed around the world in response to the
COVID-19 threat, people reacted to the sudden social isolation with an upswell
of communication and creativity. Desperate to re-establish the relationships,
connections, and communities threatened by physical distancing and shutdown
orders, people turned to what Boccaccio’s narrator would term “the interchange
of discourse”:2 they reached out and met together online, sang to and with one
another from balconies, danced for virtual audiences, read and wrote stories and
poems; they took photographs on their solitary strolls, played musical instruments
from porches or in one-person parades; they created memes or bravely re-enacted
them, taught and took classes online, read and researched, listened, watched,
1.
2.

Giovanni Boccaccio, Te Decameron, translated by J.M. Rigg (Digireads.com, 2018) at 25.
Ibid at 12.
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and shared; they expressed their feelings and fears, they followed and reacted,
liked and laughed out loud. In so doing, people created and interacted across the
physical distance, often by repurposing and reconstituting the raw materials of
others’ expressions. And thus, like Boccaccio’s sheltering storytellers, they flled
the loneliness and fought against despair by drawing upon and adding to the vast
library of human cultural expression.
In the face of plague or pandemic, copyright law may seem a frivolous
concern. But its importance lies in the ever-expanding role that it plays in
facilitating or constraining the kinds of communicative activities that are critical
to a fourishing life at any moment in history: Te visceral need to express oneself
and to hear what others have to say, to both be and to have an audience, to see
and be seen. In this article, we refect on how the cultural and educative practices
that have burgeoned in quarantine might shed new light on a longstanding
problem: Te need to recalibrate the copyright system to better serve its purposes
in the face of changing social and technological circumstances.
In Boccaccio’s time, those seeking fight from the plague “banded together
and, dissociating themselves from all others…lived a separate and secluded life…
holding converse with none but one another… .”3 Today, technology permits us
to live separate lives in physical isolation without social seclusion, and to converse
across cities, communities, and cultures without fear of contagion. As almost
every aspect of our lives has so dramatically moved online in 2020, we can see
more clearly than ever that digital environments present constantly evolving
opportunities for content producers and consumers, copyright owners, users, and
the public. But these opportunities also yield ever more pervasive restrictions and
controls—borne of a proprietarian copyright model—which impede cultural
eforts in ways that threaten to erode the public interest that copyright law should
serve—now more than ever.
In surveying some of the expressive and educational activities that have
arisen during the pandemic, this article exposes a curious dynamic that might
surprise readers not well-acquainted with the quirks of copyright law: Almost all
of the creative and communicative responses described above as examples of the
“interchange of discourse” are legally cast in copyright’s syntax as the production
of copyright-protected works and/or an infringement giving rise to potential
liability. It is a well-recognized paradox of copyright law that its purported goal
of incentivizing the creation and dissemination of expressive works can readily
be undermined by the liabilities and controls that copyright itself enables and
imposes. Te public response to the pandemic has brought that tension into
3.

Ibid at 14.
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sharp relief: In many cases, the copyright system’s celebrated insensitivity is
wholly unnecessary to stimulate creative activity, and indeed it imposes obstacles
that creators, audiences, and intermediaries must actively work around. Te
particular challenges of a digitized environment are similarly laid bare: Te same
robustly networked society that enables so much communicative activity also
ofers the technological capacity to monitor and inhibit that communication.
Tis is particularly pernicious when ostensibly infringing communications are
prevented from occurring in the frst place, such as when algorithmic flters cut
of digital streams, thereby denying them any audience at all.
In Part I, we discuss how copyright restrictions have manifested in a variety
of contexts driven by quarantine conditions, identifying particular instances of
potentially infringing activity and responses thereto, as well as possible limits
and exceptions that could or should mitigate the risks of copyright overreach.
We begin with a discussion of copyright and creative engagement, and then
move on to consider copyright and learning, with a focus on the impediments
copyright can pose to online education. In Part II, we identify some lessons that
should be learned from these extraordinary times and applied to the ordinary
operation of copyright law. We revisit the original purposes of copyright law
and its evolving justifcations, and consider the centrality of user rights and the
critical role of substantive technological neutrality in crafting a fexible and fair
copyright system for the future. Te discussion foregrounds the damage done
by efectively encoding a permission-frst approach into governance structures,
digital platforms, and networks, and proposes some potential avenues towards
mitigating these harms and correcting copyright’s course.
Ultimately, in telling these tales, we hope to convey that communication and
creativity precede copyright, both practically and theoretically; copyright and
its enforcement infrastructure must therefore operate downstream of expression
and culture—it should be instrumentalized to encourage creativity and learning
without imposing unnecessary liability risks and technological constraints that
chill or silence these expressive endeavours. When the pandemic passes, and we
emerge from isolation to refect upon what we have learned, perhaps one more
story that can be told—albeit one amongst many hundreds—might be about
how we came to appreciate that copyright law, with its established structures
of control over expression, should not stand between citizens of a participatory
democracy and the urgent benefts of the digital universe.4

4.

Robertson v Tomson Corp, 2006 SCC 43 at para 79 [Robertson] (Justice Abella, dissenting).
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I. COPYRIGHT TALES TOLD IN QUARANTINE
“Beginneth here the book called Decameron… wherein are contained one hundred novels
told in ten days…”5

A comprehensive catalogue of the surge in creative and educational activity during
the pandemic lockdown is beyond the scope of this—or any—article. Rather,
in highlighting particular examples, we aim to identify illustrative patterns of
individual and community conduct, along with responses that are either required
or enabled by copyright’s legislative framework and its application. Copyright’s
systemic bias is in favour of interpreting activity as “infringing” and therefore
requiring permission of the rightsholder. Tis is, in part, a function of copyright’s
plenary reach. In Canada, Section 5 of the Copyright Act6 provides that copyright
shall subsist in “every original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic work,”
which itself is expansively defned to include “every original production in the
literary, scientifc or artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its
expression.”7 While this breadth is nominally tempered by the requirement that
a “work” be “original” to qualify for copyright protection, originality has been
rendered an easy threshold to cross: To be original, a work “must be more than a
mere copy of another work…[but] it need not be creative in the sense of being
novel or unique.”8 It requires only that the expressive activity involve a more than
mechanical exercise of skill and judgment.9 Rightly or wrongly, it is widely agreed
that copyright in Canada extends to almost everything from TV show characters
to computer software, from accounting forms to land survey plans, and from
selfes to seismic data.10 Its sheer scope is captured in David Vaver’s observation
that copyright covers “almost anything written, drawn or expressed.”11
Copyright extends even beyond protecting “works”: It ofers protection as
well to “sound recordings,” “performer’s performances,” and “communication

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Boccaccio, supra note 1 at 10.
RSC 1985, c C-42.
Ibid, s 2.
CCH Canadian Ltd. v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13 at para 16 [CCH].
Ibid. Te Court ofered “changing the font” of a work as an example of the kind of efort
which would fall below the originality threshold.
10. See e.g. Cinar Corporation v Robinson, 2013 SCC 73; Delrina Corp v Triolet Systems Inc
(1993), 9 BLR (2d) 140, af’d (2002), 58 OR (3d) 339 (CA); U & R Tax Services Ltd v H &
R Block Canada Inc (1995), 62 CPR (3d) 257 (FCTD); Keatley Surveying Ltd v Teranet Inc,
2016 ONSC 1717; Geophysical Service Inc v Encana Corp, 2016 ABQB 230.
11. David Vaver, “Intellectual Property: Te State of the Art” (2001) 32 VUWLR 1 at 3.
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signals.”12 For these additional subject-matters, even mere originality is not a
prerequisite for protection. Te absence of an originality requirement means that
copyright extends to protect any sound recording (even recordings of ambient
outdoor sounds and surreptitious recordings of other people’s conversations)
and the defnition of “performer’s performance” is so broadly cast that it could
conceivably capture virtually any exercise of an individual’s motor functions.
Indeed, with respect to performances and signals, protection is available even in
the absence of any recording or tangible “fxation.”13
Te extent of copyright’s reach is amplifed by the capacious interpretation
that courts have given to the exclusive rights granted to copyright owners. It has
been held that even “broadcast incidental” copies of works—digital copies that
never reach an audience but are made solely to facilitate transmissions—infringe
the exclusive reproduction right.14 Te exclusive right to perform a work in public
has been held to be infringed by television cable companies sending signals to
their individual subscribers,15 when a broadcast is seen by members at a private
club, or by customers in a retail showroom.16 Te right to communicate a work
to the public by telecommunication is infringed when an individual accesses a
work by online stream,17 and when a hotel ofers its guests the ability to view a
movie in their room.18
Tus, any meeting on a Zoom video conference is a welter of potentially
infringing activities: the painting artfully hanging on the wall behind the
interviewee, the photographs pointedly on display, the television playing in the
background, the memo that is read aloud, the song that is sung, or the dance
routine performed—each ofers its own favour of prima facie infringement, often
with multiple nested infringements. (Imagine for a moment that the television
in the background is broadcasting a music video featuring a choreographed
dance performance, thereby yielding separate copyrights for the communication
signal, the cinematographic work (i.e., the video), the musical composition, the
performers’ performances, the sound recording, and the choreographic work!).
12. See Copyright Act, supra note 6, ss 15 (“performer’s performances”), 18 (“sound recordings”),
21 (“communication signals”).
13. Fixation is typically a precondition of copyright protection. See Canadian Admiral Corp v
Redifusion Inc, [1954] Ex CR 382 [Canadian Admiral Corp].
14. Canadian Broadcasting Corp v SODRAC 2003 Inc, 2015 SCC 57 [CBC].
15. Canadian Cable Television Assn v Canada, [1993] 2 FC 138 (FCA).
16. Canadian Admiral Corp, supra note 13.
17. Rogers Communications Inc. v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of
Canada, 2012 SCC 35.
18. Copyright Act, supra note 6, s 2.4(1)(a).
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Te circumstances precipitated by COVID-19 did not introduce these follies
into the copyright system, to be sure; but the massive shift to online interaction
that it prompted risks accelerating their consequences.
As will be illustrated below, this structure of exhaustive rights-granting
coupled with the expansive applications of rights produces an environment in
which the perceived need to obtain or grant permission becomes a concern with
its own trajectory and resulting inertia. Te permission-frst approach (whereby
savvy users assume that licenses must be sought and obtained from the relevant
rightsholder before their activities can safely and lawfully proceed) can hinder the
very activities that copyright is intended to facilitate: creation and dissemination.
A. COPYRIGHT AND CREATIVE ENGAGEMENT

“Beginneth here the frst day of the Decameron, in which, when the author has set
forth, how it came to pass that the persons, who appear hereafter met together for
interchange of discourse, they, under the rule of Pampinea, discourse of such matters
as most commend themselves to each in turn.”19
Many observers have remarked on the fourishing creativity and increased
consumption of cultural products brought on by the COVID-19 lockdown.20
Te breadth of artistic endeavours prompted by the coronavirus lockdown
was remarkable. Virtual concerts ranged from the One World: Together At
Home global live event featuring some of the biggest names in popular
music,21 and a performance by the Toronto Symphony Orchestra consisting of

19. Boccaccio, supra note 1 at 12.
20. See e.g. Charles Falzon, “Creativity in the Time of COVID” (20 April 2020), online: Ryerson
University <www.ryerson.ca/the-catalyst/news-updates/2020/04/creativity-in-the-timeof-covid> [https://perma.cc/V7WC-HF4R] (remarking on “the depiction of the deeply
communal, if not spiritual, movement that many are feeling, or the abundant shared humour
online, the journalistic reporting of how democracy unfolds, or cultural expression through
virtual performances and exhibitions, the monumental task of capturing the true narrative of
COVID 19”); Adrienne Jordan, “Making Money During the Pandemic: How COVID-19
is Leading a New Wave of Creativity,” Forbes (22 May 2020), online: <www.forbes.com/
sites/adriennejordan/2020/05/22/making-money-during-the-pandemic-how-covid-19-isleading-a-new-wave-of-creativity/#555a015d42b5> [perma.cc/5VHS-U5K5]. For a study
of the consumption of various forms of media during the lockdown, see Creative Industries
Policy and Evidence Centre, “Digital Culture – Consumer Tracking Study” (5 June 2020),
online (pdf ): <www.pec.ac.uk/assets/publications/Cultural-consumption-study-week-6.pdf>
[perma.cc/USL2-U73B].
21. Global Citizen, “One World: Together At Home”, online: <www.globalcitizen.org/en/
connect/togetherathome> [perma.cc/XSN7-W2LW].
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individual members’ renditions pre-recorded in isolation and edited together,22
to spontaneous shows by amateur and professional musicians alike performed
on lawns and in driveways.23 Visual art projects included Te Great Pause
Project, soliciting photographs from around the world to serve as “a repository
for observations, refections and collections from this global pandemic,”24 and
Toronto’s When Tis Is Over Board,25 which, inspired by the Before I Die project,26
consisting of large chalk boards and chalk ofered to passers-by to complete the
pre-inscribed sentence, “When this is over I want to… .”
In terms of audience consumption, the New York Times reported that in
the frst weeks of the lockdown, US consumers increased their use of Netfix,
YouTube and Facebook by between ffteen and twenty-seven percent.27 With
cinemas closed and blockbuster releases suspended, industry alarms were
sounded about “a coronavirus-induced spike in piracy,” and reports circulated of
precipitous increases in visits to downloading and streaming sites.28 Video chat
apps such as Nextdoor.com and Houseparty saw usage increases in excess of 70
per cent.29 New installations of Zoom’s video conferencing platform increased
more than 700 per cent following the March lockdown.30 Livestreaming platform
22. Melody Lau, “Watch members of the Toronto Symphony Orchestra come together for virtual
performance,” CBC (23 March 2020), online: <www.cbc.ca/music/watch-members-of-thetoronto-symphony-orchestra-come-together-for-virtual-performance-1.5506515> [https://
perma.cc/NS3A-R96P].
23. Kaylen Small, “Coronavirus: Okotoks musicians rock out from driveways to support
food bank,” Global News (24 May 2020), online: <globalnews.ca/news/6980808/
coronavirus-okotoks-music-drive> [perma.cc/9YAE-3GK8].
24. Great Pause Project, “Te Great Pause – Refections on COVID-19”, online: <www.
greatpauseproject.com> [perma.cc/P3RV-SZ8Y].
25. “Whenthisisoverboard”, online: Instagram <www.instagram.com/whenthisisoverboard>.
26. Before I Die, “A Memento Mori for the Modern Age”, online: <beforeidieproject.com>
[perma.cc/3TY8-QEKG]. Te project led to the construction of over fve thousand walls in
seventy-eight countries.
27. Ella Koeze & Nathaniel Popper, “Te Virus Changed the Way We Internet,” Te New York
Times (7 April 2020), online: <www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/04/07/technology/
coronavirus-internet-use.html> [perma.cc/D6XY-UE73].
28. Aric Jenkins, “As coronavirus forces people home, interest in streaming services is
surging. So is piracy.” Fortune (29 March 2020), online: <fortune.com/2020/03/29/
coronavirus-streaming-piracy/> [perma.cc/UNG7-4J3T]; see also Ernesto Van der Sar,
“Corona Virus Lockdown Boosts Interest in Pirate Sites and Services” (16 March 2020),
online: Torrentfreak <torrentfreak.com/coronavirus-lockdown-boosts-interest-in-pirate-sitesand-services-200316/> [perma.cc/6RQY-TTWV].
29. Koeze & Popper, supra note 27.
30. Molly Sloan, “Te 3 Secrets Behind Zoom’s Triple-Digit Growth” (10 April 2020), online
(blog): Drift <www.drift.com/blog/how-zoom-grew> [ perma.cc/9A8V-X8RF].
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Twitch—used primarily to watch others play videogames—quickly became a
popular venue for artists to connect with their fans,31 with “Music & Performing
Arts” content jumping 385 per cent over the previous year.32
Lurking in the massive shift to online dissemination and consumption
of creative content is the resulting interaction with automated copyright
enforcement mechanisms. So, for example, in mid-March YouTube notifed
its creator community (primarily those with YouTube channels who regularly
upload content for viewing by subscribers) that, due to an increased reliance on
automated systems (rather than human reviewers) to review uploaded materials,
“users and creators may see increased video removals, including some videos
that may not violate policies.”33 Te practice of high profle DJs “livestreaming”
their sets during the pandemic also ofers an illustrative example.34 Te
livestream capacity of Instagram and Facebook enabled DJs—who perform by
mixing together pre-recorded audio tracks—to reach audiences of hundreds of
thousands of isolated listeners in lockdown. Te practice spread quickly, and by
the beginning of June the platforms had implemented controls that sometimes
resulted in the sets being cut in mid-transmission.35
On May 20, 2020, Facebook (which owns Instagram) published its “Updates
and Guidelines for including music in video.”36 Te Guidelines state that the
licensing agreements that Facebook has entered into with music rightsholders
31. Tatiana Cirisano, “Twitch Users Are Getting Takedown Notices En Masse for the First
Time: Here’s Why” (15 June 2020), online: Billboard <www.billboard.com/articles/
business/digital-and-mobile/9401590/twitch-users-takedown-notices-copyright-explained>
[perma.cc/33KB-53ZL].
32. Chase, “State of the Stream April 2020: Valorant and its streamers top the charts, music
is having its moment, and streaming hits huge numbers” (13 May 2020), online (blog):
StreamElements <blog.streamelements.com/state-of-the-stream-april-2020-valorant-andvalorant-streamers-top-the-charts-music-is-having-d503aad6c2e7> [perma.cc/G5UU-K9LA].
33. YouTube, “Protecting our extended workforce and the community” (16 March 2020),
online (blog): YouTube Creator Blog <youtube-creators.googleblog.com/2020/03/
protecting-our-extended-workforce-and.html> [perma.cc/579W-D35V].
34. See e.g. Lia Respers France, “DJ D-Nice is Trowing the Best Quarantine Party” (22 March
2020), online: CNN <www.cnn.com/2020/03/21/entertainment/dj-d-nice-quarantine-party/
index.html> [perma.cc/KC33-YKLC].
35. See e.g. Jesse Washington, “DJ livestreams are under attack just when we need music the
most” (3 June 2020), online: Te Undefeated <theundefeated.com/features/dj-livestreams-areunder-attack-just-when-we-need-music-the-most/> [perma.cc/B55U-E5EC] (describing a
May 28, 2020 performance which was cut of mid-song due to a lack of clearance).
36. Facebook, “Updates and Guidelines for Including Music in Video” (20 May 2020), online:
Facebook for Media <www.facebook.com/facebookmedia/blog/updates-and-guidelines-forincluding-music-in-video> [perma.cc/GYC9-UJQB].
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impose “limitations around the amount of recorded music that can be included in
Live broadcasts or videos,” and notes that Facebook’s platform employs embedded
controls that automatically interrupt or mute livestreams when Facebook’s
systems “detect that [a] broadcast or uploaded video may include music in a way
that doesn’t adhere to our licensing agreements.” Te Guidelines are relatively
terse and ofer scant and ambiguous guidance (e.g., “shorter clips of music are
recommended”). From the DJs perspective, if they were performing their set
“live” at a club, the venue itself would be responsible for obtaining a licence
from the relevant public performance collective (such as SOCAN in Canada or
ASCAP in the United States); but when the performance involves livestreaming
their set—because clubs were no longer operating—it appears impossible for the
DJ to obtain the necessary rights from any collective (or, if obtained, to advise
Facebook of that fact) and, as noted above, even Facebook’s own clearance
mechanics appear not to allow the activity to take place if tracks (or excerpts
thereof ) of a seemingly arbitrary length are played in the set.
Te problem is not one only for DJs playing current tracks, but has also
captured, for example, ftness instructors trying to livestream exercise classes to
members of closed-down gyms; competitive dance students trying to perform
new choreography for their teammates; and even classical musicians streaming
performances of music that has long been in the public domain and is therefore
free—in theory—to be performed without copyright restrictions. Tus, for
example, the Camerata Pacifca chamber music group had its pre-recorded
performance of Mozart’s Trio in E fat (K. 498) shut of mid-broadcast because
Facebook had identifed the video as containing an audio work owned by Naxos
of America37—presumably a diferent performance of the same public domain
work, the legal rights to which are therefore entirely irrelevant to the lawfulness
of Camerata Pacifca broadcast. Unfortunately, this is a distinction without a
diference for “oft-overzealous” content identifcation algorithms.38 Some examples
have verged on farcical: During the 2020 iteration of the San Diego Comic-Con
event—delivered online due to restrictions on in-person gatherings—the cast of
the television series Star Trek: Discovery were conducting a table-read of a script
from the show when the YouTube stream was abruptly shut down, to be replaced
37. Michael Andor Brodeur, “Copyright bots and classical musicians are fghting online. Te
bots are winning,” Washington Post (21 May 2020), online: <www.washingtonpost.com/
entertainment/music/copyright-bots-and-classical-musicians-are-fghting-online-thebots-are-winning/2020/05/20/a11e349c-98ae-11ea-89fd-28fb313d1886_story.html>
[perma.cc/W86L-CF2S].
38. Ibid.
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with a “video unavailable” statement because the video “contains content from
CBS … who has blocked it on copyright grounds.”39 Tis notwithstanding
that the panel had been sponsored by CBS, which later released a statement
acknowledging that “[t]here was an issue with our content protection.”40
Similar stories unfolded with regard to the gaming-focused livestream
platform Twitch. While in the early days of the pandemic, record companies
and music publishers had “largely turned a blind eye to music licensing issues on
livestreams,” by June 2020 they began an active campaign of DMCA takedown
demands in respect of old video-clips dating back to 2017 that had included
unlicensed background music.41 Tis move did not refect any change in the
platform’s user guidelines, apparently, but rather a shift in the attention of the
music industry to the platform in light of its growing importance in the context of
the coronavirus pandemic. With hours watched on the platform growing over 50
per cent in the frst four weeks of isolation, and music artists turning to livestream
performances as an alternative to touring (including the twelve-hour livestreamed
coronavirus relief fundraiser Stream Aid 2020), music industry executives decided
this was the time to take action. As RIAA chairman Mitch Glazier explained,
“when we see a platform start to emerge as an important player, our job is to
establish artists’ rights as quickly as possible.”42 With the company reportedly in
active talks in June 2020 with record companies and publishers to secure licences,
Twitch also began “working on solutions, starting with expanding the use of
content identifcation service Audible Magic to automatically identify and delete
existing clips which may contain copyrighted music.”43 Twitch users—users, that
is, who generate the content streamed over the platform—have complained that
Twitch is not advocating on their behalf as creators,44 ofering a timely reminder
that the people posting and streaming content on online platforms are also
rightsholders in the copyright scheme, both in their capacity as users of content
and as creators, in their own right, of new “user-generated” content.
Many of the preceding dispatches regarding creativity during the lockdown
appear to culminate with a similar systemic response: Algorithmic copyright
39. Dominic Patten, “‘Star Trek’ At Comic-Con@Home Panel Goes Dark for Short
Spell Over CBS Copyright Glitch,” Deadline (23 July 2020), online: <deadline.
com/2020/07/star-trek-comiccon-panel-glitch-copyright-discovery-picard-lower-decksprodigy-cbs-1202993401/> [perma.cc/Z2RK-KX3U].
40. Ibid.
41. Cirisano, supra note 31.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
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enforcement mechanisms employed to prevent infringing activity from
occurring. “Algorithmic copyright enforcement” refers to automated systems
that screen (often contemporaneously) uploaded or streamed content, matching
it against source libraries of copyright-protected materials.45 Tese mechanisms
are generally employed by private online platforms (such as YouTube, Facebook,
and Twitter) that act as intermediaries providing users with access to content
that has been uploaded by others.46 Depending on their particular features and
operation, once an automated system has identifed a “match” (i.e., a prima facie
infringement), the system can generate a takedown request, automatically block
the content, or allow its upload/transmission; in some cases (such as YouTube’s
Content ID system), notifed copyright owners can elect to permit the continued
availability of identifed content on the condition that they receive advertising
revenues generated by its monetization.47
Te frailties and fallibilities of algorithmic copyright enforcement—
structural, processual and jurisdictional—have been the subject of academic
attention for years.48 Structural fallibilities arise from various features of the
algorithms and their operation: Studies have indicated that up to 30 per cent of
automated takedown requests are problematic in the sense that there were issues
with the accuracy of the “matching” between the library of protected content
and the new content;49 in addition, because algorithms are designed to perform
a binary infringing/non-infringing analysis, they fail to recognize the complex
layering of rights that subsist in respect of any particular content, and are
ostensibly unable to take into account copyright limitations or exceptions that
rely on discretion, context, or qualitative subtlety (such as the identifcation of
lawful fair dealing).50 Processual frailties are found in the absence of transparency
and predictability of “black-box” decision-making, as well as due process concerns
45. Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, “Automated Copyright Enforcement Online: From Blocking
to Monetization of User-Generated Content” (2020) University of Cambridge Legal
Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No 8/2020, online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3565071>.
46. Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, “Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement”
(2016) 19 Stan Tech L Rev 473 at 480.
47. Tose revenues fow back to the party who claims ownership of the underlying content to the
exclusion of the user-creator whose video is attracting the views necessary for monetization.
See Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 45.
48. See e.g. Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 46.
49. Jennifer M Urban, Joe Karaganis & Brianna Schofeld, “Notice and Takedown in Everyday
Practice” (2017) UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No 2755628, online: <ssrn.com/
abstract=2755628>.
50. Copyright Act, supra note 6, ss 29-29.2. See infra Part I.C.2.
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such as the removal of content prior to any determination of its lawfulness, and
the subsequent absence of a meaningful right of appeal or redress for errors,
or penalty for unwarranted removal. Jurisdictional problems are a consequence
of the fact that the algorithms tend to encode US copyright doctrines (with the
notable exception of fair use)51 that are then applied internationally, not taking
into account territorial diferences in copyright rules that could render uses that
infringe copyright in one jurisdiction perfectly lawful in another.52
Most troubling in the context of the concerns animating this discussion, is the
ability of algorithmic enforcement to prevent communications from occurring
at all: As Perel and Elkin-Koren describe it, “once access to materials posted
online is blocked or removed, a story may not unfold.”53 By short-circuiting
the conventional process whereby enforcement follows infringement—
re-ordering the sequence such that enforcement happens before or coincident
with infringement—the communicative acts that underpin the creation and
continuance of community are pre-emptively silenced. Tis inversion of the
enforcement process threatens to reify potentially erroneous or overly-expansive
owner rights assertions as a result of a number of factors: the initial assertion of
ownership by rightsholders is not assessed for validity; the algorithms themselves
are not programmed or vetted for compliance with substantive legal entitlements;
and, as discussed above, the algorithms are unable to take account of qualitative
determinations that defne the contours of copyright owners’ rights and can
therefore over-enforce those rights even extra-territorially. Consequently, the
platforms become “circulation gatekeepers”54 while their algorithms become the
law of the land. Others have noted the fscal, technological, and design challenges
that confront those who aim to properly refect fair use entitlements in algorithmic
enforcement mechanisms—for many observers, the conclusion is that algorithms
simply cannot properly or acceptably refect the pointillist and dynamic nature

51. 17 USC § 107 (1994). Te general and fexible US fair use defence is potentially
broader in application, particularly in respect of transformative uses, than most
international equivalents.
52. Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 45.
53. Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 46 at 491.
54. Dustin W. Edwards, “Circulation Gatekeepers: Unbundling the Platform Politics of
YouTube’s Content ID” (2018) 47 Computers & Composition 61.
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of copyright’s parameters.55 Perhaps the most pernicious outcome of imperfect
algorithmic enforcement of copyright, however, is that it torques the operation
and impact of the copyright ecology itself: As Dan Burk describes the problem,
the inaccurate mobilization of algorithmic analyses of copyright infringement
becomes the “social, legal and creative default,” and the choices of creators and
audiences become “informed, manufactured and ultimately distorted by the
architecture of regulation.”56 All of these factors shift the burden onto users to
challenge enforcement claims (when the process permits it) and to justify their
own uses (to others and to themselves) within the prevailing grammar of user
rights and exceptions.57 Even where content is infringing and its removal legally
warranted, we would note that the default prioritization of copyright protection
over free expression has its own context-specifc constitutional implications.58
For the moment, however, we emphasize that the unpredictable and seemingly
arbitrary enforcement of copyright can have the efect of obstructing the
manifold creative activities of downstream content users that have fourished—
and nourished us—during lockdown.
B. COPYRIGHT AND LEARNING
“Succinctness were rather to be desired by students, who are at pains not merely to pass,
but usefully to employ, their time… Besides which, as none of you goes either to Athens,
or to Bologna, or to Paris to study, ‘tis meet that which is meant for you should be more
difuse than what is to be read by those whose minds have been refned by scholarly
pursuits.”59

As we consider the implications of the COVID-19 crisis and the larger changes
it has wrought on Canada’s cultural landscape, we turn our attention now to its
impact on the educational environment in particular. Education is, of course,
55. See e.g. Matthew Sag, “Internet Safe Harbors and the Transformation of Copyright Law”
(2017) 93 Notre Dame L Rev 499 at 503 (noting the asymmetries between relatively
inexpensive and blunt algorithms compared to expensive human monitoring); Dan L. Burk,
“Algorithmic Fair Use” (2019) 86 U Chicago L Rev 283 (pointing out numerous theoretical,
cognitive, and technical challenges to algorithmic fair use analyses, including the simple fact
that fair use “doctrine” is not static but is constantly evolving due to judicial interpretation).
56. Burk, supra note 55 at 303–05.
57. Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 45 (Part IV(5)).
58. See e.g. Carys J Craig, “Putting the Community in Communication: Dissolving the
Confict Between Freedom of Expression and Copyright” (2006) 56 UTLJ 75 [Craig,
“Freedom of Expression and Copyright”]; Graham J Reynolds, “Reconsidering Copyright’s
Constitutionality” (2016) 53 Osgoode Hall LJ 898.
59. Boccaccio, supra note 1 at 552.
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a key ingredient of culture more broadly, contributing to both its construction
and transformation over time. Educational institutions and educators play a
vital role in shaping individuals, communities, and their interactions, as well
as in generating knowledge, contributing to public debate, and cultivating an
informed citizenry capable of the deliberative and creative tasks of modern
participatory democracy. Beyond such elevated aspirations, however, educational
institutions are—usually—where people physically gather together in classrooms
and on campuses as part of a community of learning, to acquire knowledge and
expertise, to access information resources, to produce intellectual works, to share
ideas, and to learn from one another. From textbooks and scholarly articles to
creative works and performances, and from lectures and presentations to library
collections and research databases, copyright-protected content is as vital to
education as education is to culture and democracy.
With the arrival of COVID-19, however, schools were suddenly closed and
students sent home, classes moved online, and course content hastily delivered
through posted materials and recordings, or over online video-conferencing
platforms. Textbooks were abandoned in student lockers and library books left
on shelves behind locked doors. With little or no preparation, instructors were
required to transition from traditional classroom teaching to online curriculum
delivery in an extraordinary efort to ensure that students could complete
the ill-fated winter semester of 2020. As we embark upon the 2020-2021
academic year, there is currently little clarity or consistency to be found in the
stated plans of school boards, colleges, and universities; but one thing seems
certain: We can anticipate a new normal of ongoing disruption and continued
reliance on technology to virtually connect students, instructors, and teaching
materials wherever physical attendance and assembly are precluded. If we are
indeed looking at a long-term shift rather than a short-term solution, then the
obstacles to efective online education experienced in early 2020 will have to
be addressed. Amongst many others, these include the substantial obstacles
presented by copyright law.
To understand why that is the case, we turn now to identify some of the
COVID-19-related changes that implicate copyright in new ways or at new
moments in the instruction process. First, there is the delivery of lessons online
instead of in a classroom. Where instructors would previously have, for example,
read aloud to the class from a book, projected images from the front of the
classroom, or played videos on a screen in the classroom, these activities are now
transmitted over the Internet. For what is dubbed asynchronous instruction
(the pre-recording and sharing of lessons for later viewing by students), this
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involves making and posting a recording of the lesson and whatever materials
are being displayed or performed in the course of that lesson. Te unfortunate
fact is that “copyright is essentially always involved when digital content is
used” because “any access or use of content represented in electronic form in the
digital environment necessarily involves copying (which in principle implicates
exclusive rights).”60 For copyright purposes, then, the act of recording, as well as
any uploading and subsequent downloading, will constitute “reproductions in a
material form” of any copyright work contained therein.61 Posting a recording
for later streaming by students may also implicate the “making available” right,
which is included within a copyright owner’s exclusive right to “communicate the
work to the public by telecommunication.”62
For synchronous instruction (the simultaneous delivery and receipt of a lesson
over a platform such as Zoom), the online instruction potentially implicates the
exclusive right of a copyright owner to “communicate the work to the public
by telecommunication,” which is itself a facet of the owner’s exclusive right to
“perform the work or any substantial part thereof in public.”63 If synchronous
classes are simultaneously recorded, the reproduction right will again be
triggered. A reproduction or public performance of a copyright-protected work
or a substantial part thereof without the consent of the copyright owner is prima
facie infringing.64 Some of these activities (like the preparation of PowerPoint
slides) are things that would have been done anyway, while others, such as
the audio- or video-recording, posting, and streaming of lessons, may now be
happening routinely only because the classroom doors are closed. At the receiving
end, whereas students might previously have taken their own notes during a
lesson, for example, they may now be downloading, saving and even sharing
copies of lessons.
As well as delivering lessons, instructors often require students to read in
preparation for class. Te manner in which those assigned readings can be made
60.
61.
62.
63.

Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 45 at 2.
Copyright Act, supra note 6, s 3(1).
Ibid, ss 3(1)(f ), 2.4(1.1).
Ibid, ss 3(1), 3(1)(f ); Entertainment Software Association v Society of Composers, Authors and
Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 34 [ESA]. Where the communication is limited to
students enrolled in a class, however, we would argue that the communication is not “to
the public” and so cannot implicate the public performance right. See Alberta (Education)
v Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright), 2012 SCC 37 at paras 26-27
[Alberta] (recognizing that classroom uses can be “private” even when “engaged in with
others”); see also Caird v Sime, (1887) 12 App. Cas. 326 (holding that the oral delivery of
lectures by a university professor to his students was not a communication to the public).
64. Copyright Act, supra note 6, s 27(1).
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accessible to students also interfaces with copyright entitlements. Where students
own physical copies of the textbook, and were fortunate to have it in their
possession when the schools closed, reading it poses no copyright problem. But
where students relied upon library books and physical collections on campus,
they may now have no way to access that material. Educational institutions,
libraries or publishers may be able to make e-Books or digital versions of certain
works available if they have entered into digital licensing arrangements; but if
these are unavailable or prohibitively expensive, as they often are, then access
and use of the materials may simply not be possible. Instructors and students
alike have had to take matters into their own hands in many instances, making
and sharing scanned copies, photographs, or video recordings of materials so
that their students and classmates can continue their studies in quarantine.
Making, uploading, and downloading digital copies of copyright-protected
content all implicate the reproduction right where a substantial part of the work
is reproduced. Copying protected works or extracts thereof for educational
purposes and classroom distribution is, of course, nothing new; but the utter
reliance on digital copies precipitated by the closure of libraries and physical
obstacles to access has heightened the need for accessible digital content to new
levels—and rendered undeniable the urgency of ensuring afordable access to
educational materials.
Educators are navigating a complex sea of copyright restrictions, the
anxiety-provoking nature of which is compounded by the new technological
platforms on which they must function, and the knowledge that almost everything
is being recorded. It is hardly surprising that educators are either restraining
themselves from reading aloud, from assigning or requiring certain content,
or from including images or illustrations in their lessons, or they are scrambling
to secure permissions or acquire expensive licenses for their endeavours. Tey
have long been accustomed, after all, to labouring under the shadow of an
over-bearing copyright system and within the “clear-for-fear” culture of reasonably
risk-averse institutions.65 Tis pervasive institutional clearance culture interfaces
with common contracting practices and the automated enforcement mechanisms
described above. A recent study of the terms of licences of several online platforms
popular for remote educational content delivery (such as G-Suite for Education,
Microsoft Teams, MoodleCloud, and Zoom) found that teachers using those
services are typically required to warrant to the service provider that they have
obtained permission from all third party rightsholders, thereby shifting potential
65. See Bita Amani, “Access Copyright and the Proposed Model Copyright License Agreement:
A Shakespearean Tragedy” (2012) 24 IPJ 221.
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copyright liability from the platforms to the teachers.66 Only a portion of the
licences take account of available legislated exceptions (including exceptions
that expressly contemplate remote teaching), and all uses remain subject to the
threat of automated enforcement mechanisms (which, again, do not contemplate
allowances for limitations and exceptions, risking over-inclusiveness, intrusive
monitoring practices, and self-censorship).
So let us turn now to consider some of the ways in which the copyright
system has—successfully or unsuccessfully—sought to accommodate the kinds
of creative and educational uses described above during the coronavirus crisis,
whether through permissions and licenses or existing limits and exceptions built
into the system. We can then assess how these have fallen short, and the harms
wrought by persistent misconceptions of copyright and its consistent overreach.
C. LICENCES, EXCEPTIONS, AND THEIR LIMITS
1.

EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES

Copyright’s post-lockdown story was not merely one of content uploads tangling
with algorithmic takedowns, or teachers struggling to steer through the thickets
of legal and institutional barriers. Numerous participants in the copyright
ecosystem took steps to ease the process of navigating the tangled web of rights
and tried to implement temporary “fxes” to the communicative blockages
wrought by the pandemic. We want to draw attention to a few of these attempts
at solutions—and their obvious limits.
Online training workshops and public webinars were promptly convened
by organizations such as Creative Commons, for example, to advise culture
sector professionals about copyright risks in online environments, as well as
the availability of copyright exceptions and open access materials that could
facilitate ongoing activities.67 Some publishers took steps to make certain content
freely available online available for a limited time.68 In the United States, for
example, Playscripts, Inc., a publisher of plays and musicals, made available,
66. See Léo Pascault et al, “Copyright and Remote Teaching in the Time of Coronavirus:
A Study of Contractual Terms and Conditions of Selected Online Services”
(2020) [forthcoming in Eur IP Rev], online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3652183>.
67. Brigitte Vézina, “Our Community is Reducing the Impact of COVID-19 on Science,
Education, and Culture” (4 June 2020), online (blog): Creative Commons <creativecommons.
org/2020/06/04/our-community-is-reducing-the-impact-of-covid-19-on-science-educationand-culture/> [perma.cc/X6PK-35RR].
68. See e.g. Project MUSE, “Free Resources on MUSE During COVID-19”, online: <about.
muse.jhu.edu/resources/freeresourcescovid19/> [perma.cc/NG3F-B4HG].
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on a “one-time, non-precedent setting” basis, more than four hundred of the
plays in its catalogue for livestreaming.69 Te International Federation of
Reproduction Rights Organisations (IFRRO) announced that many of its
members were “developing and adapting licences to provide access for students,
teachers and others working from home or unable to access resources because
of library and business closures during the pandemic…at no additional cost to
the licensee.”70 Canadian examples included COPIBEC, the largest reproduction
rights collective in Quebec, which temporarily increased the portion of books,
newspapers and magazines that could be scanned, displayed and shared under its
licence from 15 per cent to 35 per cent.71
Te Association of Canadian Publishers in partnership with Access Copyright
(another Canadian collective society administering reproduction rights in literary
works) announced their “Read Aloud Canadian Books Program,” accompanied
by the following statement:72
Many Canadian publishers have received requests from educators and librarians
seeking permission to read part of or all of a book and to share a video recording of
the reading for “online story-time.”
…
Te [Read Aloud Canadian Books] Program will allow, on a temporary basis, a waiver
of licence fees related to the reading of…select in-print books from participating
publishers and authors, and the posting of the video recording online.

Te waiver requires users to submit a request that includes their personal
contact information, educational institution, and details about the work read,
how much, and for how long the recording will be made available. Benefciaries
of the waiver are also required to credit the author, illustrator and publisher; state
that they are presenting their reading “with permission from Access Copyright
on behalf of the Publisher”; and post the reading “within a closed group or
password-protected platform” or, if this is “not possible,” on YouTube but marked
69. See Playscripts, “Approved Plays for Live Streaming” (13 March 2020), online (blog):
Playscripts <www.playscripts.com/blog/2020/03/approved-plays-for-live-streaming>
[perma.cc/F7FY-FZ6X].
70. See International Federal of Reproduction Rights Organisations, “IFRRO members
are responding to the challenges posed by the coronavirus pandemic”, online: <us16.
campaign-archive.com/?u=8353bb14837e4fc186bfea9cc&id=2dcdf36fd4&e=30bddf078d>
[perma.cc/JY7J-8XBP].
71. Copibec, “Remote Learning: Special Measures for Quebec”, online: <www.copibec.ca/en/
autorisation-exceptionnelle-covid19> [perma.cc/PX9Q-C653].
72. See Access Copyright, “Read Aloud Canadian Books Program”, online: <accesscopyright.ca/
read-aloud/> [perma.cc/VR4L-7PXE].
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as “Unlisted.”73 Te post must be deleted or disabled no later than June 30, 2020
(subject to possible extension), and is not to be archived or retained.
Te program sheds stark light on the limitations of such temporary grants of
permission. Not only are rigorous constraints imposed on educators simply trying
to read for their students in quarantine as they would have in the classroom, but
information is extracted in exchange for this apparent privilege. More to the
point, it is not at all clear that the publishers are waiving anything to which they
have a right. As we will see, there are various avenues to this conclusion, from
long-standing copyright principles to specifc statutory exceptions. If posting
a read-aloud recording for one’s students is already perfectly lawful, then the
publishers and the collective are purporting to gift something that is not theirs
to give. Indeed, if non-infringing uses are “user rights,” as the Supreme Court
has repeatedly assured us they are,74 then the Read-Aloud Program purports
to give to educators the privilege of doing what it is already their right to do.
Similarly, if teachers in Quebec making digital copies of, say, 25% of a work for
students to read at home is already “fair dealing,” then the expanded allowances
under Copibec’s licence are “permitting” teachers to do what the law gives them
a user’s right to do.
Worse, the illusive benefts of such “temporary passes” may continue to
impose costs long after the pandemic is over: By behaving as if a license would
be required in the absence of this waiver, one paves the way for the adoption of
overreaching licenses in the future—licenses that extract funds for uses that require
no permission and for which no payment is due. (As librarians and educators
know, there already is an unfortunate history of such extractive and restrictive
blanket licensing practices in Canada).75 Securing licenses for non-infringing
uses out of an abundance of caution is common practice in certain industries
and sectors—educational institutions included. But as Jim Gibson has explained,
the result of this “practice of unneeded licensing…is a steady, incremental, and
unintended expansion of copyright… .”76 In this sense, overly cautious licensing
practices are subject to the same critique as automated enforcement practices:
Over time, they establish norms that become the codifed (and incorrect) default,
73. See Access Copyright, “Read Aloud Canadian Books Guidelines of Use”, online (pdf ):
<accesscopyright.ca/media/1438/read-aloud-canadian-books-program-guidelines-of-use.pdf>
[perma.cc/Q6CJ-UV53].
74. CCH, supra note 8; CBC, supra note 14; Alberta, supra note 63; Society of Composers, Authors
and Music Publishers of Canada v Bell Canada, 2012 SCC 36 [SOCAN v Bell].
75. Amani, supra note 65.
76. James Gibson, “Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law” (2007) 116
Yale LJ 882 at 887.
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thereby defning the de facto parameters within which creative and educational
practices occur.
When it comes to textbooks and other volumes usually freely accessible
through libraries, some limited temporary measures have again been taken by
publishers in recognition of the extraordinary circumstances. A post on the website
of Osgoode Hall Law Library, for example, explained: “some legal publishers are
temporarily providing extended access to their electronic materials during
the duration of the COVID-19 emergencies. Please note that this is temporary
access and each publisher provides their own instructions and guidelines.”77
Navigating the list of ten or so publishers, it is quickly evident that many titles
in their catalogues are unavailable, certain publishers have made nothing newly
available, and access to free volumes is stringently limited to particular audiences
and for a specifed time. In many cases, students were simply unable to access
any physical or digital version of their assigned textbook during this period. For
students already encumbered by high tuition rates and debt loads, the prices
of physical or digital editions of textbooks can be prohibitive, rendering access
to their institution’s library collection essential to their education. Meanwhile,
libraries wishing to replace paper copies with digital e-books, with a view to
enabling lending during lockdown, fnd that many publishers do not provide
electronic purchasing options for libraries,78 and even when they do, the budget
for digital copies can purchase only a small fraction of the physical copies it would
cover.79 Once again, then, the temporary measures taken by publishers in the face
of this crisis seem lacklustre, and ultimately serve to underscore long-standing
problems that pervade commercial educational publishing.
Of course, the access problem entailed by library closures extends well
beyond the trials of university students—everyone who would normally enjoy
77. Cf. Queen’s University Library, “Legal Resources Online @ Lederman Library”,
online: <guides.library.queensu.ca/legal-resources-online> [perma.cc/3DQ9-UMG2]
(emphasis in original).
78. Te University of Guelph Library reports that approximately 85 per cent of existing course
textbooks are simply unavailable to libraries in any other format that print, identifying
the following publishers as not allowing libraries to purchase e-textbook versions: Pearson,
Cengage, Houghton, McGraw Hill, Oxford UP Canada, Elsevier Imprints, Tieme. See
University of Guelph Library, “Commercial Textbooks Present Challenges in a Virtual
Environment”, online: <lib.uoguelph.ca/news/commercial-textbooks-present-challengesvirtual-environment> [perma.cc/CEB7-VJ5X].
79. Paul Ayris suggested that a library budget for fewer than one hundred e-books could
purchase up to 20,000 paper copies of the same volume. UCL Laws, “UCL IBIL - Covid-19:
Copyright, Privacy and Competition Law” (5 June 2020) at 11h:11m:25s, online (video):
YouTube <www.youtube.com/watch?v=tI8_SiDVhRM>.
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access to books and resources in public and institutional libraries has found
themselves shut out. Physical books sit untouched on shelves while e-book loans
are rationed out over ever-expanding waitlists. One high profle response to
this pressing public need was that of the Internet Archive, which announced a
“National Emergency Library”—a “temporary collection of books that supports
emergency remote teaching, research activities, independent scholarship, and
intellectual stimulation while universities, schools, training centers, and libraries
are closed.”80 Te Internet Archive usually makes scanned digital copies of books
in its collection available through a Controlled Digital Lending (CDL) scheme,
which means lending occurs under a strict “owned-to-loaned” ratio: Te digital
copy simply stands in for the lawfully owned hard copy to facilitate access
without increasing the number of borrowers that can access the work at any one
time.81 Under the National Emergency Library initiative, the CDL restrictions
were relaxed and waitlists suspended to allow multiple simultaneous loans of
digital copies. According to the Internet Archive’s statement, this was “a response
to the scores of inquiries from educators about the capacity of [its] lending
system and the scale needed to meet classroom demands because of the [local
library] closures.”82
Te announcement sparked an outcry from publishers and authors’ rights
groups, however, who accused the Internet Archive of “aggressive, unlawful, and
opportunistic attack on the rights of authors and publishers in the midst of the
novel coronavirus pandemic.”83 Te initiative has since been suspended in the
80. See “National Emergency Library”, online (blog): Internet Archive Blogs <archive.org/
details/nationalemergencylibrary> [perma.cc/23W5-GC47]; see also Michael Geist, “Te
Lawbytes Podcast Episode 47: Brewster Kahle, Chris Freeland and Kyle Courtney on the
Internet Archive’s National Emergency Library” (20 April 2020), online (podcast): <www.
michaelgeist.ca/2020/04/lawbytes-podcast-episode-47>.
81. See David R Hansen & Kyle K Courtney, “A White Paper on Controlled Digital Lending
of Library Books” (2018), online: Harvard Library<nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.
InstRepos:42664235>; see also Emily Hudson & Paul Wragg, “Proposals for Copyright Law
and Education During the Covid-19 Pandemic” (2020), online: <https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3617720>.
82. Chris Freeland, “Announcing a National Emergency Library to Provide Digitized Books
to Students and the Public” (24 March 2020), online (blog): Internet Archive Blogs <blog.
archive.org/2020/03/24/announcing-a-national-emergency-library-to-provide-digitizedbooks-to-students-and-the-public/> [perma.cc/2EYQ-E8CJ].
83. Association of American Publishers, Press Release, “Comment From AAP President and
CEO Maria Pallante on the Internet Archive’s ‘National Emergency Library’” (27 March
2020), online: Association of American Publishers <publishers.org/news/comment-from-aappresident-and-ceo-maria-pallante-on-the-internet-archives-national-emergency-library/>
[perma.cc/BB75-4MHH].
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face of a copyright infringement lawsuit brought by four commercial publishers
in respect of both the National Emergency Library and the usual CDL program.84
Tere are strong arguments to be made in Canada—as there are in the US
and elsewhere—regarding the current lawfulness of making and lending digital
copies of the books already held in physical collections.85 Te pandemic has only
underscored the importance of this practice for enabling and equalizing access
to information resources—and yet, judging from the response of publishers and
authors, it seems clear that it will take more than the current crisis to move the
dial on digital lending as accepted common practice. In the meantime, stringent
copyright controls continue to hamper public access to lawfully acquired books.
2.

EXISTING LIMITS AND EXCEPTIONS

As the above suggests, while the online activities that we have canvassed could
implicate copyright interests, a signifcant portion of them may be perfectly
lawful uses—even in the absence of permissions and licenses—in light of the
limits and exceptions that are an integral part of Canada’s copyright system.
With regard to the kind of consumer-created videos and performances
described in Part A, consider, for example, Canada’s unique statutory exception
for non-commercial user-generated content, which provides that it is not an
infringement of copyright for someone to use an existing copyright work that
is publicly available in the creation of a new work, or for them to authorize the
new work’s dissemination by an intermediary such as YouTube or Twitch.86 Te
purpose of the use must be non-commercial, the source must be mentioned where
reasonable, and there must be no substantial adverse efect on the exploitation
of the existing work. While there are uncertainties around the non-commercial
purpose requirement and its implications for, say, monetization of a popular
video on YouTube, the reality is that this provision should render lawful the vast
quantity of user-generated content posted by citizens in their everyday online
84. See Brewster Kahle, “Temporary National Emergency Library to close 2 weeks early,
returning to traditional controlled digital lending” (10 June 2020), online (blog): Internet
Archive Blogs <blog.archive.org/2020/06/10/temporary-national-emergency-library-to-close2-weeks-early-returning-to-traditional-controlled-digital-lending/> [perma.cc/5LE2-6473].
85. See Ariel Katz, “Copyright, Exhaustion, and the Role of Libraries in the Ecosystem of
Knowledge” (2016) 13 JL & Policy for the Information Society 81 [Katz, “Copyright,
Exhaustion and the role of Libraries”]; Adrian Sheppard, “Controlled Digital Lending” (6
February 2019), online (blog): Te Quad <blog.ualberta.ca/controlled-digital-lendinga5e9d14dc56b> [perma.cc/3VKN-5J6G].
86. Copyright Act, supra note 6, s 29.21 (added by the Copyright Modernization Act,
SC 2012, c 20).
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activities. Indeed, this was the explicit intention behind its enactment.87 So that
is the good news; the problem is that, under automated content ID systems and
extra-territorial application of US law, it does not much matter. Te exception is
rendered unusable and all but redundant for practical purposes.
Similarly, many of the uses we have described may constitute fair dealing,
which is recognized in Canada as a “user right” that the Supreme Court of Canada
has repeatedly explained “must not be interpreted restrictively.”88 While such uses
have to be undertaken for a statutorily enumerated purpose, these now include
“education,” “parody,” and “satire,” as well as “criticism or review” and “news
reporting”—purposes that “must be given a large and liberal interpretation in
order to ensure that user rights are not unduly constrained.”89 Te assessment of
the “fairness” of a use is a contextual inquiry and depends on the facts of each case;
but where a use is appropriate in light of the purpose, where it does not take more
than is reasonably necessary for that purpose, or threaten to act as a substitute
in the market, there is a good chance that it is fair and non-infringing.90 Te fair
dealing defence could thus extend to protect many of the transformative creative
re-uses of content made by people in their everyday online activities, which are
hardly likely to compete in the market for the original work whether or not they
have a commercial purpose. As the Supreme Court of Canada recently reiterated,
user rights play “a vital role in…promoting the public interest. Te ability to
access and use ‘works’ within the meaning of the Copyright Act are ‘central to
developing a robustly cultured and intellectual public domain.’”91
Unfortunately, the context-specifc nature of the fair dealing analysis and
its unpredictable application by the courts mean that users are often reluctant
to rely upon it, and copyright owners unlikely to concede that it applies.
And, as with the user-generated content exception, in the digital context, the
lawfulness of fair dealing in principle may not translate into the freedom to deal
fairly in practice, especially when online environments are policed by automated
87. Te Government of Canada website gave as examples of what would ft within this
exception: “making a home video of a friend or a family member dancing to a popular
song and posting it online, or creating a ‘mash-up’ of video clips.” “What the Copyright
Modernization Act Means for Consumers”, online: Government of Canada <web.archive.org/
web/20150325001832/http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/crp-prda.nsf/eng/rp01186.html>.
88. CCH, supra note 8 at para 48.
89. Ibid at para 51.
90. See e.g. SOCAN v Bell, supra note 74; Alberta, supra note 74; Wiseau Studio, LLC et al v
Harper et al, 2020 ONSC 2504.
91. Keatley Surveying Ltd v Teranet Inc, 2019 SCC 43 at para 45 [Keatley], citing SOCAN v Bell,
supra note 74 at paras 9-10.
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content identifcation.92 As we have seen, algorithms, by design, are not trained
to conduct such analyses.
Turning again to the educational context, even where institutions have not
entered into licensing arrangements,93 there are also limits and exceptions within
the Copyright Act that should permit many of the instructional uses that we have
described above. Specifc limited exceptions for educational institutions permit,
for example, the reproduction of a work “or any other necessary act, in order to
display it” for the purposes of “education or training,” as well as the reproduction
or communication of works “as required for a test or examination,”94 and the
performance of lawfully acquired sound recordings and flms to an audience
consisting primarily of students.95 While these provisions apply to acts undertaken
“on the premises of the educational institution,” amendments drafted specifcally
to facilitate distance learning mean that an enrolled student who receives a
lesson over the Internet is now “deemed to be a person on the premises of the
educational institution.”96 Under these 2012 provisions, lessons that contain
otherwise infringing acts that are permitted under an exception can be recorded,
communicated over the Internet, and copied by students without infringing
copyright in the underlying works. Conditions apply, however, requiring measures
to limit further communication and copying, and—frustratingly—to destroy
92. But see Lenz v Universal Music Corp, 801 F (3d) 1126 (9th Cir. 2015) [Lenz v Universal
Music Corp] (afrming a lower court ruling that copyright owners must consider whether a
use is fair use before they can issue a takedown notice in good faith).
93. Educational institutions typically pay large sums to license digital resources, with the terms
of some of these transactional licences (though not enough of them) permitting the kind of
digital uses required for remote instruction. Many institutions also pay a collective society for
blanket licences that permit a certain amount of copying of textbooks and other published
works in their repertoire. Others have opted out of these blanket licensing arrangements.
See Michael Geist, “Myths and Realities about Canadian Copyright Law, Fair Dealing, and
Educational Copying” (30 April 2019), online: Info Justice <infojustice.org/archives/41053>
[perma.cc/3B2N-Q8G3]; see York University v Te Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency
(Access Copyright), 2020 FCA 77 [York University v Access Copyright]; see also Ariel Katz,
“Spectre: Canadian Copyright and the Mandatory Tarif – Part I” (2015) 27 IPJ 151.
94. Copyright Act, supra note 6, ss.29.4(1) and 29.4(2); but note that the Section 29.4 exceptions
do not apply if the work or other subject-matter is commercially available, within the
meaning of section 2, in a medium appropriate for the purpose.
95. Copyright Act, supra note 6, s 29.5. Section 29.5(c) extends this to the performance in
public of any work or other subject-matter at the time of its communication to the public
by telecommunication. See also Section 32.2(1)(d), which permits the reading in public
of a reasonable excerpt from a published work. Arguably, this could apply to instructors
and others reading aloud online, if interpreted in accordance with a robust principle of
technological neutrality. See infra Part II.A.
96. Ibid, s 30.01(4).
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copies of lessons within thirty days of the release of fnal evaluations.97 Another
2012 addition allows educational institutions to reproduce, communicate,
or perform for students works that are lawfully available through the Internet,
provided that source and author are attributed, and the work was not protected
by a digital lock or notice clearly prohibiting the action.98
As this might suggest, the ability of educators to comfortably rely on these
exceptions for educational institutions is hampered by their stringent specifcity,
onerous conditionality, and legal complexity (which, in some instances, renders
them almost inscrutable even to copyright experts).99 Fortunately, it is generally
unnecessary to rely on these specifc exceptions by virtue of the more expansive
fair dealing defence described above, which can broadly apply to fair uses of
copyright works for the purposes of research, private study, and—as of 2012—
education.100 As Lisa Macklem and Sam Trosow have explained, Canada’s fair
dealing defence is sufciently broad to cover many of the educational uses of
copyright content for emergency remote teaching.101 When it comes to assessing
fairness in relation to purpose, Trosow and Macklem stress, “the extreme and
extraordinary circumstances surrounding Covid-19 would weigh heavily here.
Te public interest goals in supporting both public interest and social distancing
goals are indisputable.”102 While each use requires its own analysis, the point to
stress here is that, particularly in the context of the current crisis, a large swathe
of the copying and sharing of articles, extracts, and images done by instructors
for the purposes of providing an education, or facilitating student research and
private study, is likely to satisfy the contextual demands of fair dealing. Teachers
are unlikely to copy more than is reasonably necessary to achieve their educational
objectives; there are few if any realistic alternatives to the sharing of digital copies
under these circumstances; and it seems implausible that publishers could show
demonstrable economic harm as a direct result of the copying, particularly

97.
98.
99.
100.

Ibid, s 30.01.
Ibid, s 30.04.
See e.g. ibid, s. 30.01 (noting the cumbersome defnition of “lesson”).
Ibid, s 29 (“Fair dealing for the purpose of research, private study, education, parody or satire
does not infringe copyright.”); see CCH, supra note 8 at para 54 (confrming that fair dealing
is always available notwithstanding the availability of a specifc exception).
101. See Samuel Trosow & Lisa Macklem, “Fair-Dealing and Emergency Remote
Teaching in Canada” (21 March 2020), online (blog): Sam Trosow <samtrosow.
wordpress.com/2020/03/21/fair-dealing-and-emergency-remote-teaching-in-canada/>
[perma.cc/5X5Z-DVSN].
102. Ibid.
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when the move online occurred when it was impractical to expect students to
purchase more books.103
Unfortunately, however, at the institutional level, there typically remains a
great deal of uncertainty around what constitutes lawful fair dealing practices,
and a reluctance to rely on the user rights of students and educators in the face
of threats of litigation and liability.104 With increasing uncertainty around this
question in Canada, we can expect to see educational institutions continue
their cautious approach to educational copying, entering costly and restrictive
commercial licenses, purchasing expensive paper and digital copies, and imposing
onerous limits and responsibilities on instructors tasked with continuing to satisfy
learning objectives under ongoing quarantine conditions. Here, as elsewhere, the
COVID-19 crisis has only revealed and exacerbated long-standing problems in
our copyright system and its operationalization. It has laid bare not only the
copyright-related challenges that users (students and educators) must navigate to
meet the demands of lockdown and emergency remote teaching; it has revealed
that copyright controls and traditional publishing practices have hampered the
ability to access materials in the way that users would prefer (or as required by
circumstance). Tus, students are cut of from afordable digital content while
educators are stymied in their eforts to migrate their teaching from physical to
virtual environments.
Te crisis has also revealed a wide gap between the actual limits of copyright
in law—which have been carefully crafted in Canada in recent years to achieve
an appropriate balance between copyright owners and users—and the restrictions
that (real or perceived) copyright control continues to impose upon pedagogical
practices and knowledge-sharing in reality. Many of the existing allowances
within the copyright system are, in practice, not up to the task required of
103. Cf Alberta, supra note 74 at para 35–36; see also CCH, supra note 8 at para 70 (the Court
confrmed that “Te availability of a license is not relevant to deciding whether a dealing
has been fair”).
104. Tis situation has not been helped by the recent Federal Court of Appeal ruling in York
University v Access Copyright, in which it was held that universities are not mandated to
enter into costly blanket licensing arrangements with copyright collectives, but nor can
they comfortably rely on Fair Dealing Guidelines like those in place at York University to
shield them from infringement liability. See York University v Access Copyright, supra note
93. Te reasons supporting the latter conclusion were frequently at odds with Supreme
Court authority, however, and ought not to survive an appeal to that Court. See Michael
Geist, “Federal Court of Appeal Deals Access Copyright a Huge Blow as it Overturns
York University Copyright Decision” (23 April 2020), online (blog): Michael Geist <www.
michaelgeist.ca/2020/04/federal-court-of-appeal-deals-access-copyright-huge-blow-as-itoverturns-york-university-copyright-decision> [perma.cc/49TP-WBRZ].
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them: they tend to be either too ambiguous to ofer clear guidance upon which
users, educators, and institutions can comfortably rely; or they are so opaque or
persnickety that they are rendered impenetrable and impractical. Here, again, the
accrued complexity of the copyright system, with its multiple overlapping rights
and limits, generates its own inertia: Attempts at corrective actions are generally
limited in scope or accessible only to experts already steeped in copyright’s
subtleties, thereby serving to perpetuate a constricted approach to creative
and educative activities. As we will see in Part II, this gap between user rights
and copyright restrictions refects a damaging dissonance between the original
objectives and public purposes of the copyright and its impact on living and
learning in an increasingly digital world.

II. LESSONS FROM ISOLATION
“I acknowledge that the things of this world have no stability, but are ever undergoing
change.”105

Part I considered the kinds of solutions that have been employed in eforts to
sustain creative and educational practices during the pandemic, identifying the
signifcant copyright-related barriers to creative users and online learners—and
suggesting that these reveal larger, more fundamental problems with the system
and its operation. Education and cultural activity can be threatened—silenced
even before a sound has been uttered—if sufcient friction is introduced into
the system in which they occur; as we have seen in Part I, a permission-frst
sensibility permeates many educational environments, even when not warranted,
and the very channels of digital communication are increasingly being designed
to monitor and impede communicative activities even when the matter of
“infringement” does not admit of a simple determination. In Part II, we turn to
tell a grander tale of copyright and its teleology, in the hope that we can imagine
a happier ending to these unwinding stories of copyright in the time of COVID.
A. COPYRIGHT’S ROLE IN THE INFORMATION ECOSYSTEM

Perhaps the place to start is at the beginning? A great deal of scholarship has
examined the historical origin story of modern copyright law to try to extract
lessons about its initial justifcations and intended purpose that might inform our

105. Boccaccio, supra note 1 at 552.
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current constructions.106 While such historical explanations are not syllogistically
determinative, as Peter Drahos explains, “[h]istory is one distinctive kind of
story-telling and [intellectual property] is an area in need of many more critical
historical stories.”107 With this in mind, one oft-made point bears mentioning
for those more familiar with today’s proprietary model of copyright owners’
entitlements than with their pragmatic and instrumentalist underpinnings: Te
frst copyright legislation, the Statute of Anne of 1710, was entitled “An Act
for the Encouragement of Learning.”108 By placing a limited term right to control
the printing of copies in the hands of authors, the story goes, copyright at its
inception was aimed at breaking up the printing monopoly enjoyed by the
Stationers, and thereby furthering the interests and education of an increasingly
literate public. Indeed, the Act contained provisions aimed at ensuring the
accessibility of published books, including a mechanism for controlling the prices
of books if found to be “too high and unreasonable,” and a statutory duty for
printers to deliver books to university libraries in Scotland and England.109 Tere
are prequels even to that copyright story. Libraries and universities predated
copyright, and their role in “the ‘encouragement of learning’ was acknowledged
before legislators decided to grant authors exclusive rights in their writings”—and
was expressly preserved in the frst copyright statute.110 As Ariel Katz explains:111
Te historical precedence of libraries and the legal recognition of their public function
cannot determine every contemporary copyright question, but this historical fact is
not devoid of legal consequence… As long as the copyright ecosystem has a public
purpose, then some of the functions that libraries perform are not only fundamental
but also indispensable for attaining this purpose.

106. See e.g. Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective (Vanderbilt University Press,
1968); Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: Te Invention of Copyright (Harvard University Press,
1993); Ronan Deazely, On the Origin of the Right to Copy (Hart, 2004).
107. Peter Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property (Australian National University eText,
2016) at 17, online (pdf ): <press-fles.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/n1902/pdf/book.pdf>.
Drahos continues: “One purpose of such stories would be to help evaluate the orthodox
forms of justifcation for intellectual property.”
108. Te full title was “An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies
of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times
therein mentioned.”
109. Statute of Anne 1710, 8 Anne, c 19, ss IV–V; see Katz, “Copyright, Exhaustion, and the Role of
Libraries”, supra note 85 at 85.
110. Universities were permitted to print and sell books regardless of any exclusive rights granted
to others, and publishers were required to provide the best quality copy of every printed book
for the use of public libraries and universities. See ibid at 84–85.
111. Katz, “Copyright, Exhaustion, and the Role of Libraries”, supra note 85 at 122.
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Notably, this passage was recently quoted by the Internet Archive in its
defense of the National Emergency Library, supporting the following assertion:
“Libraries buy books or get them from donations and lend them out. Tis has
been true and legal for centuries. Te idea that this is stealing fundamentally
misunderstands the role of libraries in the information ecosystem.”112
To do essentially the same thing, the argument goes, but employing the benefts
of digital technologies to do it better, is simply to perform the same role within
the information ecosystem without being subjected—unnecessarily—to the
constrictions of the physical world.
When it comes to understanding the information ecosystem, we are in a
very diferent world from that of the early days of the commercial printing press,
with diferent capacities and diferent constraints. Yet clear parallels might be
drawn between the paradigm-shifting emergence of printing technologies that
feature in the copyright origin-story and the emergence of digital technologies in
the Internet era. Towards the turn of the twenty-frst century, content industry
incumbents became concerned about the potential for the Internet to destroy
the economic benefts they had come to enjoy as content providers, just as the
Stationers of seventeenth century England worried about the de-monopolization
of the printing presses. Tey moved to strengthen copyright and expand its efective
reach into the online environment, just as the Stationers sought to re-establish
their permanent monopolies through the extension of common law copyright.113
With the conclusion of the World Intellectual Property Organization’s Internet
Treaties in 1996,114 and the enactment of the international standard-setting US
Digital Millenium Copyright Act in 1998,115 the copyright system was shored up
for a digital future before that future had even taken form. Tis system we now
see shaping our online lives—a system of extended private rights and digital
locks, of notice-and-takedown obligations and redundant user rights—is not an
accident but an accomplishment of economic power and political persuasion.
As Ruth Okediji has explained, the pre-emptive move to safeguard copyright
during the digital shift pivoted on the old presupposition that proprietary control
was a critical incentive for knowledge production; but it failed to acknowledge the
112. See Chris Freeland, “Internet Archive responds: Why we released the National
Emergency Library” (30 March 2020), online (blog): Internet Archive Blogs <blog.archive.
org/2020/03/30/internet-archive-responds-why-we-released-the-national-emergencylibrary/> [perma.cc/WK5K-AYTG].
113. Millar v Taylor (1769), 98 ER 201, 4 Burr 2303 (KB); cf Donaldson v Beckett (1774),
1 ER 837, 4 Burr 2408 (HL).
114. WIPO Copyright Treaty, 20 December 1996 (entered into force 5 March 2002).
115. Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Pub L No 105-304, 112 Stat 2860 (1998).
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extent to which digital technologies had fundamentally “disrupted long-settled
canons of [this] classic copyright defense,” both by “perfecting authorial control
over terms of access to creative works,” and by “illustrat[ing] clearly a truth
muted by the regimented world of print works, namely, that robust creativity
and corresponding economic success require users’ ability to access and fully
engage creative content… .116 Seemingly lost in this process was the connection
between the capacities of digital technology and the objectives—as opposed to
the traditional operation—of the copyright system. As Paul Goldstein wrote, the
arrival of the Internet may be “the ultimate phase in copyright’s long trajectory,
perfecting the law’s early aim of connecting authors to their audiences.”117
As Cheryl Foong has since explained, “internet communications hold vast
potential for furthering copyright’s dissemination function more efectively
than ever before.”118
Put another way, technology has achieved in leaps and bounds what copyright,
with its internal paradoxes, could only ever inch us towards: Te development
of “a robustly cultured and intellectual public domain.”119 Network technologies
have an incredible capacity to advance the social objectives that justify the
copyright system—but, as we have seen, that capacity can be constricted by
its oppressive operationalization. Te protection of copyright and incumbent
industry interests has become an end in itself; when copyright policy prioritizes
the protection of copyright owners’ exclusive control over the advancement of
its public purposes, it undermines its own justifcations and threatens its own
legitimacy as a constitutional limit upon free expression.120
Te point of this story becomes clearer when we turn to consider copyright’s
purposes. Ascribing purpose to copyright law is, admittedly, a fraught task.
An enormous number of possible goals have been assigned to the copyright
system across space and time, many of them in obvious tension. We have already
seen that the original stated purpose was ‘the encouragement of learning.’ Te US
Constitution, most famously, describes the purpose as “to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors … the exclusive
116. Ruth L Okediji, “Te Regulation of Creativity Under the WIPO Internet Treaties” (2009) 77
Fordham L Rev 2379 at 2380.
117. Paul Goldstein, Copyright’s Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox, revised ed
(Stanford Law and Politics, 2003) at 216, cited in Cheryl Foong, Te Making Available
Right: Realizing the Potential of Copyright’s Dissemination Function in the Digital Age (Edward
Elgar, 2019) at 8.
118. Ibid.
119. SOCAN v Bell, supra note 74 at paras 9–10.
120. See Craig, “Freedom of Expression and Copyright,” supra note 58.
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Right to their respective Writings.”121 Te Supreme Court of Canada has more
recently described the ends of copyright as “a balance between promoting the
public interest in the encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and
intellect and obtaining a just reward for the creator.”122 It has since elaborated:
“[t]he proper balance among these and other public policy objectives lies not
only in recognizing the creator’s rights but in giving due weight to their limited
nature.”123 Canada’s 2012 Copyright Modernization Act, which implemented
the aforementioned WIPO Internet Treaties, described the Copyright Act as “an
important marketplace framework law and cultural policy instrument” that
“supports creativity and innovation and afects many sectors of the knowledge
economy,” with the grant of exclusive rights aimed at providing rightsholders
with recognition and remuneration, while also limiting those rights to “enhance
users’ access.”124 Most recently, the Supreme Court of Canada has opined that
“balance between creators’ rights and users’ rights must inform the proper
interpretation and scope” to be given, not only to the exceptions and limitations
in the Copyright Act but to all of its provisions.125 Tus, as the Court explained: 126
Téberge refected a move away from an earlier, author-centric view which focused on
the exclusive right of authors and copyright owners to control how their works were
used in the marketplace… . Téberge focused attention on the importance copyright
plays in promoting the public interest, and emphasized that the dissemination of
artistic works is central to developing a robustly cultured and intellectual public
domain. …[B]oth protection and access must be sensitively balanced in order to
achieve this goal.

Even from these synopses we see myriad burdens placed on the copyright
system: encouraging the creation of works, protecting the economic and moral
rights of authors, incentivizing the development of distribution mechanisms
for the dissemination of creativity, enabling users to access existing works, and
create their own new works, maintaining a market for creative expression and
encouraging innovation. But the big picture also comes into focus: Ultimately,
copyright is a state-constructed system of entitlements granted by law to support
communicative activity and a vibrant public domain by incentivizing and

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

US Const art I, § 8, cl 8.
Téberge v Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc, 2002 SCC 34 at paras 11–12, 30.
CCH, supra note 8 at para 10.
Copyright Modernization Act, SC 2012, c 20, Preamble.
Keatley, supra note 91 at para 47.
SOCAN v Bell, supra note 74 at para 9–10.
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facilitating creativity and dissemination.127 It follows that copyright’s allocation of
rights, liabilities, and limits should be balanced to “maximize social engagement,
dialogic participation and cultural contributions.”128
What remains, then, is to consider what the shift from analog to digital—
and now from the pre-COVID “normal” to the “new normal”—should mean for
this delicate balancing act, and the capacity of copyright law to achieve its goals.
What seems obvious in the very concept of balance is the need to adjust the
weight and distribution of rights and interests in order to maintain a consistent
equilibrium as the ground beneath us shifts. Te Supreme Court of Canada has
already captured this notion of purposive rebalancing in its expansive vision of
“technological neutrality” as a guiding principle in the application of copyright
norms. Justice Abella explained in a 2006 concurring decision:129
Te Copyright Act was designed to keep pace with technological developments to
foster intellectual, artistic and cultural creativity. In applying the Copyright Act to a
realm that includes the Internet…the public benefts of this digital universe should
be kept prominently in view.… “Te Internet and new technologies have unleashed
a remarkable array of new creativity, empowering millions of individuals to do more
than just consume our culture, instead enabling them to actively and meaningfully
participate in it.”

In 2012, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada articulated a substantive
version of this principle when it insisted that “the traditional balance between
authors and users should be preserved in the digital environment.”130 More
recently, in dissent, Justice Abella wrote:131
Te question…is how to preserve [the balance that best supports the public
interest in creative works] in the face of new technologies that are transforming
the mechanisms through which creative works are produced, reproduced and
distributed.… Te answer to this challenge, in my view, lies in applying a robust
vision of technological neutrality as a core principle of statutory interpretation
under the Copyright Act.

127. See Carys J Craig, Copyright, Communication and Culture: Towards a Relational Teory of
Copyright Law (Edward Elgar, 2011) at 52.
128. See ibid at 54.
129. Robertson, supra note 4 at para 79, citing Michael Geist, Our Own Creative Land: Cultural
Monopoly & Te Trouble with Copyright (Te Hart House Lecture Committee, 2006) at 9,
online (pdf ): <cdn.michaelgeist.ca/wp-content/uploads/2006/05/hhl06_Online_Book.pdf>.
130. ESA, supra note 63 at para 8, citing Carys Craig, “Locking Out Lawful Users: Fair Dealing
and Anti-Circumvention in Bill C-32” in Michael Geist, ed, From ‘Radical Extremism’ to
‘Balanced Copyright’: Canadian Copyright and the Digital Agenda (Irwin Law, 2010) at 177.
131. CBC, supra note 14 at paras 147–48.

600

(2020) 57 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

A robust vision of technological neutrality asks how the law ought to apply
if it is to further the purposes of the copyright system. Te consistency sought
is not consistency in the application of the law, but rather in the steady pursuit
of its normative objectives in the face of change. Such a purposive approach
to technological neutrality does not necessarily act as a restraining infuence
on expansions or contractions of copyright rights (whether those of owners
or users)—the point is not to “maintain” or “restore” a status quo ante, but to
ensure that, as the cultural environment in which copyright is deployed changes,
copyright entitlements do not become ossifed and refective of a past which no
longer obtains. For present purposes, this means that as cultural and educational
activities shift online for the foreseeable future, the legal claims enabled by
copyright may need to be curtailed so they do not unduly inhibit the very
activities those claims are nominally intended to enable.132
Tus, if a primary goal of the copyright system is to maximize the distribution
of intellectual works, then it follows that the narrowing opportunities for
physical distribution of copies should be compensated for by a broadening of
opportunities for digital distribution. If a primary goal of the copyright system is
to encourage people to engage in creative expression, then it follows that a swell
of creative engagement by the masses should be facilitated as opposed to quashed.
And if a primary goal of the copyright system is to sufciently reward those who
create intellectual works for the beneft of us all, then it follows that everyone’s
creative endeavours should be permitted whatever audience and recognition they
are able to garner, accompanied by the rewards that come with that recognition
(whether fnancial or personal, external or internal). In other words, the copyright
balance—the balancing act between enforcing owners’ rights and protecting
users’ rights, and between protection and access—must adjust to the new realities
of the times in which we fnd ourselves. Tat might mean giving greater weight to
users’ rights of access than to owners’ rights to exclude when we fnd ourselves at a
moment in history in which physical exclusion is inescapable, and digital access is
the only open door to creative engagement, education, and participatory culture.
B. SOME NEW NORMS FOR A “NEW NORMAL”?

In the stories we have told so far, we see both the promise and the copyright-stunted
potential of network technologies to smooth over the gaps between our ofine
isolation and our online sociality. During a viral pandemic, in a period of
physical distancing, these gaps can feel more like gaping chasms. But even when
132. Carys J Craig, “Technological Neutrality: Recalibrating Copyright in the Information Age”
(2016) 17 Teor Inq L 601.
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we return to normal—whatever our new normal is—the copyright lessons we
should have learned in isolation will have much to teach us about improving
the next chapter in our digital future. So, having pointed to the interplay of
copyright’s policy purposes, the central role of user rights, and the principle of
substantive technological neutrality, we want to braid a few narrative threads into
the next passages of copyright’s story.
First, it should be clear that the shift from the analog to the digital world
has implicated copyright in the everyday activities of engaged citizens—in their
personal communications and intellectual pursuits—in a way and to an extent
that was never previously the case. Even activities that implicated copyright
interests in the ofine world were often irrelevant to the overall functioning of
the system and unlikely ever to be “caught” in what was an inherently “leaky”
system. Tis leakiness was a feature and not a bug of the copyright system—
mitigating the consequences of copyright’s paradox. But now, as our whole lives
move online, technology is increasingly plugging these “leaks” and transitioning
us towards a time of perfect content monitoring by circulation gatekeepers and
absolute automated control. As Jessica Litman has wryly observed, however,
only the “breathtaking hubris” of copyright lawyers can explain the apparent
assumption that copyright law should “govern every single way that information
coded in electrons can move from one computer to another.”133 We need to
actively recalibrate the copyright system to restore its equilibrium in the digital
environment, recognizing that there is nothing perfect about perfect control, and
counterbalancing technical measures by building leaks and limits back into the
system by design.
Tat lesson fows swiftly into the next: User rights are vital to maintaining
the appropriate balance between rewarding authors and the public interest that
underpins a normatively coherent copyright system, and it is therefore essential
to copyright’s legitimacy that we fnd ways to better safeguard users’ rights in our
online interactions. Not only does this require that strong, fexible, technologically
neutral, and readily comprehensible exceptions are shored up in our copyright
law, but also that these rights can be enjoyed and, where necessary, enforced
by users. Tis will demand careful attention to the algorithmic systems that
identify, block, and take down lawful content, with a view to ensuring improved
transparency, accountability, and attention to the complexities of the various
legal rights at play. It will also require improved system architecture for enabling
users to interact with moderators and (human) decision-makers for the purposes
of mediating disputes and easily mounting appeals. As Niva Elkin-Koren has
133. Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (Promotheus Books, 2006) at 30.
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suggested, this could include algorithmic enforcement of user rights as an equally
automated countermeasure to redress the current imbalance.134
We would like to imagine that the next twist to the tale of algorithmic
enforcement will see user rights faithfully reinscribed into the code that governs
online life, together with a capacity to operationalize jurisdiction-specifc
copyright limits and exceptions, and mechanisms to appropriately privilege
access and sharing over takedown measures, at least pending human review.135
Where identifed content is monetized rather than removed, such systems should
also recognize creative users as authors in their own right, enabling a more just
distribution of funds between multiple overlapping rightsholders, and thereby
encouraging rather than punishing downstream dialogic creativity.136
Te mechanisms that might be deployed to revive or preserve users’
rights could take a variety of forms, coming from both within and beyond
the copyright system. Some combination of copyright reform and consumer
protection measures, for example, could seek to ensure that copyright users’
rights cannot simply be overridden by boilerplate contracts (such as platform
terms of service), thereby placing the onus onto online service providers to
ensure that their oferings are properly solicitous of a broad fair dealing defence
and other consumer concerns.137 Judicial dialogue also has a key role to play (as
Téberge and its progeny aptly demonstrate): Just as US courts have reminded
copyright owners that they must give good faith consideration to potential fair
use defences before issuing take-down demands,138 courts should be attentive
to the importance of efecting balance—possibly through judicious application
of technological neutrality as an interpretive device—when making decisions
134. Niva Elkin-Koren, “Fair Use by Design” (2017) 64 UCLA L Rev 1082. But note that Burk,
among others, has queried whether such automated (or human) countermeasures are feasible
at scale. See Burk, supra note 55 at 300.
135. See Communia Association, “Article 17 Implementation: German Proposal Strengthens
the Right of Users and Creators” (24 June 2020), online: Communia <www.
communia-association.org/2020/06/24/article-17-implementation-german-proposalstrengthens-right-user-creators> [perma.cc/Y9MJ-UZYU] (describing the German proposal
to enact a system whereby users must be able to “pre-fag” uploads that make use of protected
works covered by an exception, that are openly licensed or free from copyright. Works that
are “pre-fagged” and not obviously infringing cannot be automatically fltered and may
be removed only after human review by the rightsholders (in the meanwhile they must
remain online).
136. Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 45.
137. See e.g. Pascale Chapdelaine, Copyright User Rights – Contracts and the Erosion of Property
(Oxford University Press, 2017).
138. See Lenz v Universal Music Corp, supra note 92.
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about infringement, injunctions, and the allocation of rights and obligations;139
copyright operates within an ecology of technology and practice, and judicial
decision-making should be alive to those material realities. Beyond law, the
technology and engineering praxis demands a deeper interdisciplinary dialogue to
close the chasm between nuanced legal norms and the technological architecture
through which their stringent regulatory force is felt.
Te fnal narrative thread we want to pull upon here is the clear need to
fundamentally rethink traditional publishing models in the textbook market
and more broadly. If physical books are increasingly inaccessible—whether due
to physical distancing or prohibitive pricing—and increasingly undesirable in a
digital world, we have to critically re-examine a system that locks institutions,
libraries, students, and educators into limited and unworkable options as ostensibly
captive audiences. Te faws of the old system have now been fully exposed.
Rather than waiting endlessly for market incumbents to embrace the digital
shift, it is time for educational institutions, instructors, and faculty members
to turn the page on proprietary textbooks and to commit instead to developing
Open Educational Resources, and to making Open Access publishing the default
not only for scholarly research, but for teaching materials across the board.140
Rather than relying on expensive and restrictive licenses, libraries and users need
the option of afordable openly licensed materials that actually facilitate online
access. Tey also need the confdence to engage in and facilitate fair dealing
practices and other lawful uses, which means systematically safeguarding them
against threats of litigation and potentially devastating liability.
Of course, these three threads—restoring copyright’s equilibrium in
the digital environment, shoring up user rights in practice, and reimagining
traditional publishing models—only begin to gesture towards solutions to the
many problems identifed in these tales of copyright during the COVID crisis.
But by pointing to a variety of potential dynamic responses to the copyright risks
and restrictions that have revealed themselves during this trying time—as well as
the framing principles that ought to guide them—we hope to fnish this story on
something of a positive note.

139. See CCH, supra note 8 at para 11 (describing the Copyright Act as setting out “the rights and
obligations of both copyright owners and users”).
140. Hudson & Wragg, supra note 81; see also Trosow & Macklem, supra note 99; see e.g.
OER4Covid, “OER support group for educators during covid19,” online: <oer4covid.oeru.
org/> [perma.cc/59YR-WRZK].
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III. CONCLUSION
Tese stories about copyright, creativity, and learning in the time of COVID
ofer avenues to re-examine the common copyright narrative—the one that tells
us that copyright encourages learning and the creation and dissemination of
works—and to lay bare its disconnect from the current realities of our digital
dependency. Te legal structure of copyright has been designed over time to
efect a form of polycentric balancing, granting expansive rights but also tailoring
their limits and curtailing their reach in an efort to recognize the symbiotic and
dialogic relationships between creators and audiences, educators, and learners.
But digitized enforcement mechanisms appear incapable of giving efect to those
fne-grained calibrations, and the complexity of layers of copyright interests—
combined with risk-averse individual responses and institutional policies—means
that information fows, whether educational or creative, are unjustifably choked
of just when we need them most. Te lessons to be taken from these tales are not
limited to the current crisis, but should inform our evolving copyright norms in
whatever “new normal” emerges; they are lessons for how copyright should and
should not work if it is to serve its policy objectives and consistently advance the
public interest over the course of time and social change. Tere are any number
of positive outcomes that might emerge from this crisis for copyright policy
and our larger information ecosystem, if only we digest the lessons of the past
and use our collective creativity to imagine an alternative future—as all the best
story-tellers do.
“In truth, had it been honestly possible to guide you whither I would bring you by a road
less rough than this will be, I would gladly have done so.”141

141. Boccaccio, supra note 1 at 12.

